| Tuesday, August
12, 2008
Those interested in the new Cold War may find this amusing:
http://twentymajor.net/wp-content/photos/orig_georgia.jpg
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Georgia on My Mind
I suppose I should write an essay on this, but I don't really have time.
I can say that whatever moral imperatives we may have to help Georgia
pales into insignificance compared to our moral obligations in 1956 when the
Hungarians revolted against Russian rule. I have an old friend who had been
a captain in the Hungarian national army; his unit attempted to take a movie
studio in the hopes of finding American uniforms, which they would wear in
hopes of making the Russians believe the Americans were coming.
Eisenhower sent Hungary no help. The danger of Central Nuclear War was
too great, and we did not have the military force present in the area to
create a fait accompli.
The Russians retain over 20,000 nuclear warheads, and several thousand
ICBM's. We have not built Ballistic Missile Defenses. The Russians still
have missile submarines. The only real defense of the coasts is ground based
lasers with popup mirrors, as described in the first reports of the Citizens
Advisory Council on National Space Policy written for Reagan in 1980. We
have not built those defenses. We are not equipped to play nuclear chicken
games. We have stood down most of our deterrent force, and our Strategic
Forces are vulnerable to a number of first strike scenarios.
Of course it will never come to Central Nuclear War; so we say. But the
only effective intervention we could make in Georgia would require
"tactical" nuclear weapons. The problem is that the a tactical nuclear
weapon, during the Cold War, was one that went off in Germany; use of nukes
anywhere else would precipitate strategic nuclear strikes. If we attempted
intervention in Georgia with anything other than nukes, it would be a
disaster. If we attempted to use nukes against Russian forces, what would
then be the limits of conflict? Would Baltimore harbor survive?
Of course the Russians would never think that way, just as they would
never send tanks into Prague, or into Georgia. But every part of the history
of the last century taught the Russians one thing: there is no such thing as
overkill. If you are going to fight, send in everything you can. (I believe
the US term for this is shock and awe...)
Walter Lippmann once wrote that military power was like a bank account
against which the diplomats could write checks; and it was very possible to
be overdrawn. The United States is very nearly overdrawn now.
If we want to play the game of world Empire, there are costs. The first
is to create SAC again, complete with full restoration of the ICBM force,
young officers in silos on Christmas and other holidays, air crews sleeping
in quarters on runways, rebuilding the numbered Air Forces. The second is
real Strategic Defense, with orbital elements, ground based lasers, pop-up
mirrors, local, and midrange interceptors, endgame defenses, and the
homeland security measures required to protect all that. None of this is
cheap. It is unlikely that the American people will pay that cost.
We may be the only superpower, but that does not automatically give us
mastery of the world, and it is unlikely that the American people would pay
the costs in blood, treasure, and ruthlessness to assume that role.
Military power is like a bank account. We may draw against it, but being
overdrawn is not advisable. If we attempt any real intervention in Georgia,
we will be overdrawn. The US has many common interests with Russia. It may
be time to look into those. We may have more influence with the Russians as
friends as we would ever have in a new Cold War.
And see below
=========
Chronicles: Your Home is Not Your Castle
http://www.telegram.com/article/
20080809/NEWS/808090323/1008/
=============
L' Affaire Plaime developments:
http://jammiewearingfool.blogspot.com/
2008/08/bad-day-for-left-gets-
worse-plame-suit.html
=============================
I am getting a number of emails with my
return address promoting various products including something having to do
with Angelina Jolie. Of course I did not send those.
I will generally no send you links except possible to this
web site, and any email I write will be pretty unambiguously from me; but
even then be careful.
============
Subject: The Russo-Georgian War
and the Balance of Power | Stratfor's take,
Jerry
Here is Stratfor's take on Georgia and Russia:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/
russo_georgian_war_and_balance_power
I find little to disagree with.
Ed
= = =
Little to disagree with indeed. The US policy of trying to encircle Russia
instead of making friends with the Russians has been a disaster, and will
remain so. Kosovo was key: we were willing to bomb a sovereign state to
require them to give part of their territory to illegal alien invaders. If
we would do that, what else might we do? Clearly Russian security lay in
their military forces, not in any kind of pledges from either Republican or
Democratic politicians in the United States.
Why it was thought necessary for the US to
generate a cordon sanitaire around Russia is beyond my kenning. And I fail
to comprehend why we were not working actively to prevent a Georgian
invasion of a territory composed mostly of ethnic Russians. We had a
presence there. It was not used to prevent war. Indeed, from first
appearance we did nothing to prevent, and may have encouraged, Georgian
adventurism.
We sowed the wind. The Georgians have reaped
the whirlwind, but the returns are not all in. We may yet find more reasons
to regret our actions here; and the more blustering we do at this point the
sillier we look. We should not make empty threats. God save us if the
threats we make are not empty.
EWO. EWO. Emergency War Orders....
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