Name Withheld to protect the innocent. I know the author of this.
Jerry,
Please post this anonymously. I can verify my "authenticity"
in any manner you feel is necessary.
The problems the Army study has documented are similar to what I've
personally seen as a Lt. and Junior Capt. in the USAF. There is little
trust above the squadron level, and essentially zero trust above the wing
level. One of the biggest gripes is the way the Military Personnel Command
currently handles assignments. In the interest of fairness and to address
the growing number of early separations, USAF aircrew are almost randomly
assigned to their next assignment based entirely on shortfalls during the
previous quarter. This results in large periods of units being overmanned
or undermanned, and the late corrections and apparent lack of any planning
whatsoever results in waves of "good deals" and "bad
deals", neither of which have any relationship to the aircrew's
experience, qualifications, career goals, or intentions to stay or leave
the military.
The classic pattern repeating every single day in the USAF, goes
something like this:
Young Capt. Smith gets his pilot wings, and goes to an operational
squadron. He likes operational flying, although his squadron is
undermanned and he's pulling 12 hour days plus doing janitor work because
there are not enough junior enlisted members doing junior enlisted member
jobs, and the civilian contractors come in only once a week.
Capt. Smith gets lucky, and his next assignment is also to an
operational flying squadron. He progresses in his field, becomes an
experienced instructor in his squadron, and takes command jobs within the
squadron structure. He still works 12 hours a day, but now he's supposed
to be the one organizing the rest of the pilots into trash detail. It's
embarrassing when a Lt. Col is the only one emptying the trash, so the
Lt's are kept busy emptying trash instead of studying tech manuals and
tactics. Ah well, Capt. Smith is looking forward to pinning on major
during his next assignment and since his squadron is still undermanned, he
figures it might be smart for the USAF to give him another flying
assignment.
Unfortunately, MPC decides that Capt. Smith needs to grab an M-16, hop
into a HUMVEE, and drive around Korea for a year (or Germany for 2 years)
as an Air Liaison Officer. Capt. Smith has no desire or intention to drive
a jeep around, having made the decision long ago to join the USAF instead
of the Army. Capt. Smith asks MPC to reconsider their assignment decision,
but he's told that they don't bargain. Either he takes the assignment or
he gets out.
Capt. Smith leaves the USAF after 9 to 12 years service (with zero
retirement and no retirement account because military members aren't
allowed to save up for their own retirement like the REST OF THE FREE
WORLD), and he takes several million dollars of training and experience to
the airlines who pay him according to the value of his skills, allow him a
union to prevent steady decline of his medical and other benefits, and he
never ever has to chase trash around the squadron again. He's now treated
like a professional instead of a number, he's allowed to choose a career
path and follow it, and he can change jobs or locations when the
opportunity arises. He also is immediately eligible for company sponsored
retirement plans and his benefits could potentially start after just a few
years in the company.
Lt. Jones sees what happened to Capt. Smith, and he bails out as soon
as possible.
MPC shouts FOUL! and overreacts by pushing more pilots out the door.
It's the same with comm/computers career field, maintenance, security
police, pretty much every single field in the USAF. There seems to be very
little personnel planning going on so it gets worse and worse. The simple
example I used of a highly trained and (relatively) highly paid person
being underused as a janitor also has parallel examples in every field. On
the aircraft maintenance side, the severe lack of spare parts results in
10 aircraft rotating on the flying schedule using as few as 4 absolutely
critical parts. 4 aircraft fly, the parts are pulled out as soon as they
land, and are put in the next 4 planes. This wears out the parts
unbelievably quickly, the wear and tear on connectors results in glitches
that are almost impossible to track down and fix (one plug in the F-15E
goes bad so often it's the first thing checked for many of the aircraft
system problems), and our poor maintenance guys are working their tails
off doing what they know in their hearts is an absolutely stupid exercise
in futility.
Of course, since all 10 jets flew, the squadron shows up on the reports
as fully mission capable...
Sorry about the rants, but it's the same all over the military. Take
any 5 squadrons in the USAF and only 2 or 3 can be fully funded and
capable at any one time. It's one of those issues that are
"simple" funding problems, but the futility of the whole thing
is one more reason to get out. The first year I was in an operational
squadron, we ran out of copier paper. There was absolutely zero available
funding, so the crews of the worlds premire strike fighter in the worlds
premire air force spent hours every monday running around the base
stealing paper from everyone else so we could run the squadron for one
more week.
There should be absolutely no question in anyone's mind why there are
retention problems in the US military. It's a tough stressful job with
long hours, degrading benefits, and no apparent support from the top
leadership. "Mission creep" affects everyone's day to day lives
as not only are military units ordered into situations they're not trained
for, but every time a manpower cut is made, the work doesn't go away.
Someone else has to pick up the slack in addition to their primary duties.
Upgrading the commisary or tacking an extra percent onto the pay scale
isn't the answer but so far that's all they've come up with after looking
at the problem for several years. Ah well, in a few years it'll be my time
to decide whether or not I want to continue to participate. I honestly
don't know if I'll stay in or not.
I could go on and on... The 50 page legal document we were required to
read, memorize, and follow that evolved out of the desert storm rules of
engagement. It was still called the ROE, but it required a briefing from a
lawyer to explain... The wing commander can't cancel flying operations
even during severe thunderstorms before 1400 hrs on a Friday without the
permission of some general halfway across the state... Supply running out
of flight suits... Learning that half of our chem warfare suits were
defective... I'll quit now and hit send before I start calling people
names.