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Saturday,
September 26, 2009
'But if the nation as a whole repeats California's mistakes, the
consequences will be much more severe; an America beset by rigid
bureaucracies, economic decline, and enervated spirit will not be able to
preserve liberty at home or protect it abroad.'
A must-read:
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/who-killed-california
-- Roland Dobbins
It is often said that California points the way to
the future of the US. California has long been dominated by liberal
politicians using the system to insure their independence from the voters
while they implement very liberal policies. The result is mixed with some
benefits but more and more an environment that drives both business and
wealth out; even the entertainment industry is seeking other places.
============
Obamacare or jail.
http://www.politico.com/livepulse/0909/Ensign_receives_handwritten_confirmation_.html?showall
- Roland Dobbins
I suppose the penalty is the same for deliberately
not paying other Federal taxes. Of course Obamacare tax is not a tax, since
it is for your own good. The benign intentions of the State changes
everything. They have the fixed intention of doing you good.
==============
The following is a long
introduction to the history of US-Iranian relationships. To go to the end of
this article, click here.
==
Foreign Policy Research Institute Over 50 Years of
Ideas in Service to Our Nation www.fpri.org
Footnotes The Newsletter of FPRI's Wachman Center
THE U.S. AND IRAN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE by Shaul
Bakhash
Vol. 14, No. 26 September 2009
Shaul Bakhash is the Clarence Robinson professor of
history at George Mason University. This essay is based on his presentation
at "U.S. Foreign Policy and the Modern Middle East," a Summer Institute for
Teachers sponsored by The American Institute for History Education and The
Wachman Center of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, held June 25-27,
2009, in Philadelphia. For essays and videofiles from the conference, visit:
http://www.fpri.org/education/modernmiddleeast/
----- Webcast Jytte Klausen, The Cartoons That Shook
the World
Wednesday, September 30, 2009 11:30 AM - 12:30 PM
Eastern Time
The audio webcast is free and open to the public
To register for the webcast visit:
http://register.webcastgroup.com/l3/?wid=0740930094850
On Wednesday, September 30, FPRI will host a booktalk
by Jytte Klausen On her new book "The Cartoons That Shook the World" (Yale
University Press). The publication of the book has been accompanied by a
controversy over Yale's decision not to publish the Muhammad cartoons even
though they Are the subject of the book -- inadvertently demonstrating that
the Cartoons are still shaking the world, and the story is not over.
Klausen is a professor of comparative politics at
Brandeis University. Her earlier book, "The Challenge of Islam: Poltiics and
Religion in Western Europe," was published by Oxford University Press in
2005 and subsequently published in German and Turkish.
THE U.S. AND IRAN IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
by Shaul Bakhash
The U.S. has had relations with Iran ever since
the last quarter of the nineteenth century. American missionaries have been
in Iran even longer than that. But the United States' real engagement with
Iran dates only from WWII. The relationship has generally been close, but it
has been punctuated first by the involvement of the CIA in the coup of 1953
which overthrew a popular prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and then by
the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to a breach in relations that has
not yet been repaired. Indeed, two countries that were once close friends
and allies now see each other, respectively, as the "Great Satan" and a
member of an "Axis of Evil."
Looking at how some of the leading historians
and analysts of the U.S.-Iranian relationship have dealt with this issue,
it's interesting to note this constant sense of loss, of what might have
been. Barry Rubin entitled his work on the relationship Paved with Good
Intentions; James Bill subtitled his Eagle and the Lion with "The Tragedy of
Iranian-American Relations." Gary Sick, a former member of the National
Security Council, subtitles his "America's Tragic Encounter with Iran." A
recent book by journalist Barbara Slavin plays on this idea of a
relationship that might have been much better than it is, entitling her book
Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies.
Between 1945-79, the U.S.-Iranian relationship
was in some ways similar to the U.S.-Saudi relationship, where the U.S.
dealt with one ruling family. In the case of Iran, the U.S. dealt with one
ruler, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who came to the throne in 1941 and
continued to rule for almost four decades. In this period, the relationship
was governed by a number of enduring and persistent features.
First, on the American side, the interest in
Iran was due in large part to the country's strategic location, bordering,
on the one side, the Persian Gulf and on the other, at least until the
collapse of the Soviet Union, sharing a very long border with America's
previous adversary. Iran was also important because of its oil. During the
Cold War, Iran was both a potential target of Soviet expansionism, against
which it had to be protected, and a potential and often real ally in the
struggle against the Soviet Union. Finally, as Iran grew wealthier from oil
revenues, it became increasingly a market for U.S. goods, arms, industrial
equipment, technology, investments, and, during the oil boom years after
1973, the employment of American technicians, advisers, specialists and the
like.
On the Iranian side, first, the U.S. was seen
as a potential protector, initially against the dominance of the two great
powers that Iran had experienced throughout its 19th-century and early
20th-century history - Russia and Britain; and then against the Soviet
Union. A second persistent feature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship was
Iran's view of the U.S. not only as a patron and protector, but also as an
ally in advancing what one scholar has called the Shah's dreams of grandeur;
the idea that Iran could and should be a great power, at least in the
region.
Iran's 19th-early 20th century history with
Britain and Russia/the Soviet Union included wars with both these powers.
Iran lost territory to both, principally to Russia. Both countries were
deeply involved in Iran's economy and trade, and both interfered extensively
in Iran's internal affairs and politics. Beginning in the 19th century, Iran
sought what I call a "third-country policy" - that is, trying to find a
country that could counterbalance these two great powers. In the 19th
century, it was sometimes Germany, sometimes France. In the 20th century,
particularly beginning in WWII, Iran began to look to the U.S. But this
older history of wariness of great powers has played a role in Iran's
relations with the U.S. as well. A country that was seen for the most part
of the period after 1941 as an ally, a great power in its own right, could
also be seen as a country playing once again the imperialist role. As we
have seen since the 1979 revolution, it is largely in this role that Tehran
has viewed the U.S in the last three decades.
One can view the U.S.-Iranian relationship
since WWII in four phases. First, from 1941-53, Iran sought a protector and
friend; the Shah actively and determinedly sought to woo the U.S., to
attract it into a closer relationship. Second, from 1953 to the late 1960s
(post-overthrow of Mossadegh), with the restoration of the Shah, who had
fled the country, to the throne, as the result of a coup engineered in large
part by the CIA and British intelligence, was a period in which Iran was
very dependent on the U.S. - on American protection, support, and aid. This
was not quite a patron- client relationship, and Iran and the Shah's
independence of the U.S. grew. But nevertheless, it was clear that the U.S.
was the senior partner in the relationship. Third, in the period 1973-79,
the relationship became much more of a partnership. The shah was much more
stable at home, wealthier, and more adept at handling his foreign relations.
He began to make demands. Fourth and finally, since 1979, the two countries
have been adversaries and have had no direct political and diplomatic
relations at all.
WWII AND POST-WWII When WWII broke out, Iran
declared neutrality. But the Russians and British invaded Iran in August
1941 anyway. They did so principally for two reasons. First, Iran had had
very close relations with Germany. The myth that the ruling monarch of the
time was pro-fascist/German has now been addressed and dismissed. But there
was a large German presence in Iran, and the British feared for the security
of their oil wells in the south, and the Russians for their oil wells in
Baku, across the Iranian border.
Secondly, once Hitler invaded Russia in spring
1941, the allies needed Iran's land route to supply the Russian army. This
would not have been impossible under a neutral Iran, and therefore the
Russians and British decided to invade Iran. They got rid of the shah and
placed his son on the throne. This also brought American troops to Iran to
facilitate the supplies that moved from the Persian Gulf across Iranian
territory to the Soviet Union.
The Shah courted the U.S. assiduously in this
period as protection against the two great powers that had occupied the
country. On the whole, the U.S. was willing to be wooed and seduced. Early
on they gave Iran considerable support. It was the U.S. that persuaded
Russia and Britain to sign an agreement to withdraw their troops from Iran
within six months of the end of hostilities in the war. The Russians'
behavior in Iran was moderated because of the U.S. presence.
When at the end of WWII the Russians insisted
on keeping their troops in Iran and supported a quasi-breakaway autonomous
movement in the Iranian province of Azerbaijan, the U.S. was very helpful in
pressuring the Russians to withdraw and end this support. Already during the
war, a permanent feature of the U.S.-Iranian relationship had begun. The
Americans sent advisors to assist in building up the Iranian army, police,
and gendarmerie force and to assist in other areas of Iranian administration
such as finance.
The shah, who was always ambitious to build up
a large army, already began in this period what became a perennial theme in
the relationship, which is to urge the Americans to supply his army with
more advanced armaments.
MOSSADEGH AND OIL NATIONALIZATION CRISIS This
honeymoon period in the U.S.-Iranian relationship faced a crisis in 1951,
during the movement to nationalize the Iranian oil industry. Iran's oil
industry was the most important industry in the country. It was the
principle source of foreign exchange revenues. It was the largest employer
in the country. But it was British controlled. Iranians had no say in the
management of the company, or production, or setting oil prices. For years,
the British government had derived from the Iranian oil operation far more
income than the Iranian government itself. In the late 1940s and then
genuinely in 1951, there began a movement to nationalize the oil industry.
This movement was led by Mossadegh, who became Prime Minister. The oil
industry was in fact nationalized in March 1951. Then there began a two-
year struggle between Iran and Britain over this act.
During the Truman administration, the U.S.
government was supportive of Iran. The US was suspicious of the old imperial
powers, and supported nationalist movements, which it thought were a good
barrier to the spread of communism. There was genuine sympathy with the
plight of the Iranians and their desire for more control of their oil
industry. The Truman administration was often in the position of urging the
British to be more forthcoming in meeting Iranian demands.
The British from the beginning were very
unsympathetic to nationalization and decided that Mossadegh was not a
reasonable man with whom they could deal. They sought to have him removed
from office. They tried to persuade the U.S. to join them in a plot to
overthrow him. Truman was not willing to go along with this idea, but as
soon as the Eisenhower administration came in, it was very receptive. Both
President Eisenhower's secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, and his
brother Allen, the head of the CIA, were Cold Warriors. JFD believed that
neutrality in the Cold War between the Soviet bloc and the U.S. was immoral.
They joined the British in a plot which, after some wavering and
uncertainty, did succeed in overthrowing Mossadegh in August 1953.
This was a seminal event in the modern history
of Iran. The involvement of the CIA and British intelligence in a coup that
overthrew a properly elected and very popular PM has remained seared into
the Iranian historical imagination and has colored the relationship
U.S.-Iranian relationship.
There were a number of other important
repercussions of this U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Mossadegh. The
Shah, who almost lost his throne over the affair, returned to Iran in August
1953 determined that this should never happen to him again. After 1953,
there was increasing royal autocracy and intolerance for criticism, dissent,
independent political parties, an independent press or an independent
parliament.
Second, the shah's dependence on U.S. support
was intensified and entrenched. In fact, having brought the shah back to
power, the U.S. had a deep interest in seeing that his regime was stable and
that he remained on the throne. Therefore, he was given not only moral and
diplomatic support, but financial and other forms of aid as well.
In the minds of the Iranian political class,
the impact of this U.S. involvement was two-fold. On the one hand, the idea
that America was different from the older imperial powers persisted. The
opposition, including Mossadegh's own party, the National Front, continued
to believe that just as America had helped Iran against the imperialists in
the past, it would come back to its senses and help them again.
On the other hand, the U.S., which had been
seen as supportive of Iran's national interests, was now seen in another
light. Both these trends of thinking persisted among the Iranian political
class pretty much down to the time of the 1979 revolution, although the
close alliance of the shah and the U.S. in these years, particularly in the
late 1960s and 70s, these years of growing royal autocracy, clearly brought
the Iranian belief in America's commitment to democracy, to put it mildly,
under great strain.
These were also years in which the shah, both
in terms of what he considered Iranian national interests and also because
of his reliance on U.S. support, when Iran's foreign policy was very closely
aligned with America's foreign policy. As a result, tensions with the USSR
increased, and Iran was quick to join the Baghdad Pact, which saw Iran,
Turkey, Pakistan and Britain allied together in a defense pact with the U.S.
an informal partner.
This close U.S.-Iran alignment on foreign
policy issues in the 1950s and the early 1960s was occurring at a time when
elsewhere in the Middle East and Asia we saw the rise of nationalists
governments. In the Middle East in particular, monarchies seemed to be
falling like flies. Revolutionary officer regimes were coming to power in
Egypt, Iraq and Syria. The great nations of Asia, India, China, and
Indonesia, were leading a non-aligned movement. Therefore the shah, in terms
of the broader trends in the Middle East and the region, seemed isolated.
All this did not go very well with the younger generation in Iran, and
broadly speaking, with the educated middle classes. The shah was pursuing a
foreign policy, however sensible, one might argue, that went against the
grain of the dominant political mood in the country.
The shah also developed, in this period, very
close relations with Israel - not because of the U.S., but because of his
own calculations of where Iran's interest lay. He saw all around him Arab
regimes that were radical, increasingly allied to the Soviet Union,
republics rather than monarchies. It made sense then, that the enemy of your
enemy was your friend, and Iran's relations with Israel grew increasingly in
this period. Not among all, but among a significant element in the
population, it was unpopular.
The events surrounding what became known as the
Status of Forces bill (1964) - the U.S. just signed a similar agreement with
Iraq, SOFA - also proved controversial. These SOFA agreements the U.S. has
with many countries where it stations troops are intended to protect
American troops or military advisors in other countries from the "terrible"
local courts. It in effect extends diplomatic immunity to military personnel
serving in a foreign country. In 1964, the U.S. pressured a reluctant shah
and a very reluctant parliament and reluctant government cabinet to sign a
SOFA to cover American military personnel in Iran. The agreement immediately
aroused memories of so-called capitulations which were very common in the
region in the 19th century and which also exempted European nationals from
the jurisdiction of native courts, Iranian courts in the case of Iran,
Ottoman courts in the case of the Ottoman empire, Egyptian courts in the
case of Egypt. In fact, Ayatollah Khomeini, who 15 years later was to lead
an Islamic revolution in Iran, was expelled from the country for opposing
very publicly the status of forces bill, which he called an agreement for
the enslavement of Iran.
These were all ways in which the U.S.-Iranian
relationship soured in the 1960s-70s. But the fact that the press,
parliament, and political activity was controlled meant that the pros and
cons of this close relationship the shah had reached with the U.S. were
never openly discussed and public opinion was never openly articulated.
At the same time, the shah was never really a
client of the U.S. In fact, he always chafed at having to do America's will
and sought to escape this tutelage as quickly as he could. As his regime
grew more stable, especially as Iran's oil revenues increased, he tried to
shake the U.S. off. He did so increasingly successfully. The U.S. was
preoccupied with Vietnam, the Nixon doctrine which led to the twin- pillars
policy, the idea that regional powers allied with the U.S. should take
responsibility for regional security, and that Iran and Saudi Arabia should
shoulder more responsibility for Persian Gulf security, meant the U.S.
relied more and more on the shah and more on him than on Saudi Arabia, which
lacked Iran's size, population, or military clout. The Shah welcomed this,
partly because it enhanced his own role and importance, and partly because
he wanted to escape U.S. tutelage.
Then as oil prices exploded in 1973-74, Iran's
oil revenues quadrupled overnight. The shah became not a debtor to the U.S.
or the countries of Europe but a creditor. Iran not only gained enormous
economic clout, but also offered the U.S. in a period of financial
stringency and high oil prices a huge market for arms, industrial equipment,
technology, and employment.
In this period the U.S. did make a number of
serious errors in Iran, in addition to doing a number of things correctly.
Aside from a brief period under President Kennedy's administration, when
Kennedy pressured the shah to begin some reforms in Iran, particularly to
break up the landed estates and give a greater share in land ownership to
the peasantry, there was very little pressure in this entire period on the
shah in the political sphere. The U.S. was pleased to see Iran stable and
developing. It was developing spectacularly. The U. S. was pleased to have a
large market for American goods. And as long as there was very little
internal unrest, it seemed that everything was under control. The U.S. in
this period, when it had weight and influence in Iran, missed opportunities
to guide the shah politically, internally, in another direction.
Second, the U.S. was so pleased with the close
alliance and with the apparent stability of the shah's regime that it began
less and less to study closely the internal political situation. We know now
that a time was reached when at the shah's insistence, the CIA agreed that
it would not do its own intelligence work in Iran, but would rely on the
shah's sources. When the boom in oil prices occurred and the shah decided to
use this huge revenue, less wisely than other Gulf states, to try and
catapult Iran into economic advancement and industrialization, the result
was huge dislocations in the economy. Not only the U.S. but all the European
countries were complicit in an economic policy that proved in the end very
destabilizing to the shah's regime. The attempt to inject into the economy a
significant amount of money in a very short period of time caused huge
dislocations, and explains in part the discontent that helped fuel the 1979
Islamic revolution.
When that revolution took place, U.S.-Iranian
diplomatic relations were broken and have not been restored since. The
Islamic movement itself had from the beginning an anti- American component.
Khomeini's revolution was against the shah, rooted primarily in internal
problems. But it was also against the shah's close relations with the U.S.
This stemmed from two very obvious factors. First, after all, the Americans
had supported the shah, and the opposition therefore saw the U.S. as
complicit in the shah's autocracy. One also cannot forget that Khomeini was
exiled from his own country and spent 14 years initially in Iraq and then
briefly in France as a result of opposing the SOFA.
Second, Khomeini both in leading the revolution
and then in stabilizing it once the monarchy had been overthrown, played
very adeptly on anti-American sentiment. The themes of anti- Americanism, of
America as the shah's supporter, became themes not only of the revolutionary
campaign but of post- revolutionary Iran as well.
Third, the seizure of the American embassy by
student radicals and the taking of American diplomats as hostages had an
enormous impact. Some 50 Americans remained hostages in Iran for 444 days,
from November 1979 until the inauguration of President Reagan in 1981. This
has left a deep impact on the American political imagination and also on the
Iranian one. For the Americans, this was a searing experience; for the
Iranians, it was a moment of triumph. The students who seized the embassy
became overnight heroes.
Fourth, there was the U.S. position during the
Iran-Iraq war. When the war broke out, the U.S. formally at least adopted a
position of neutrality and did not supply arms to either side. America hoped
the two sides would wear out and exhaust each other. But once Iran looked as
if it might actually win the war and bring Saddam down, the U.S. began to
support Saddam, not only diplomatically, but with intelligence. The U.S.
also remained virtually silent when Saddam used chemical weapons against
Iranian troops.
Finally, there has been the problem on the
Iranian side of the U.S. attempt to sanction, isolate and demonize Iran and
to view Iran as pursuing policies in Lebanon, on the Arab- Israeli conflict,
and elsewhere, hostile to American interests.
It's not as if during these years there was no
U.S. attempt to reach out to the Iranians or vice versa. The first president
Bush, in his inaugural address, referring to U.S. hostages held in Lebanon
by Iranian prot‚g‚s, used the phrase "good will breeds good will." The
Iranians did then help secure the release of these remaining U.S. hostages,
but no good will came in reciprocation. Early in the Clinton administration,
the president of Iran offered a U.S. company, Conoco, a large oil deal, but
Clinton prevented the deal from going through. President Clinton himself,
especially in his second term, attempted on a number of occasions to reach
out to the Iranians without success.
So there were attempts in these years to repair
relations. Why didn't they succeed? First, there was the legacy of the
hostilities of the past on both sides. Second, there are concrete issues
dividing the two countries. In any Iran-US rapprochement, Iran would want to
see an end to U.S. sanctions against Iran, and an end to America's attempts
to isolate Iran and deny it technology, trade, and credits. The U.S. would
expect Iran to change its posture on Israel, to stop attempting to be a
spoiler in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process, and to end its support for
groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza strip hostile to
Israel. Also, for the U.S. there's the issue of Iran's nuclear program.
In addition, some forms of Iranian foreign
policy behavior to which the U.S. particularly takes exception have become
very entrenched. Iran's hostility to Israel has become a pillar of its
foreign policy; its investment in Hezbollah in Lebanon is a long-standing
policy. Iran and the U.S. are now competitors for influence in the Persian
Gulf and the Middle East. Iran may be a small and weak country compared to
the U.S., but it does have its visions of grandeur. It sees itself as the
great power of the Persian Gulf region. It believes the U.S. must make space
for it at the table in deciding the future of Iraq or Afghanistan. One can
see how much at odds the Iranian position is from America's.
The events in Iran surrounding the June 23
elections will make it much more difficult for President Obama, who has
tried to open a new page in U.S.-Iran relations, to allow his senior
officials to sit at the table with Iran. But even had these events not taken
place, U.S.-Iran relations would remain fraught with difficulties and
obstacles.
---------------------------------------------------------- Of Related
Interest
The Future of Iran, by Kenneth Pollack, FPRI Enotes,
September 2008
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/
200809.pollack.futureiran.html
An Israeli View of the Iranian Nuclear Challenge, by
Efraim Inbar, FPRI Enotes, April 2008
http://www.fpri.org/enotes/
200804.inbar.israeliviewirani
annuclearchallenge.html
The Making of the Modern Middle East, a 10-volume
series for middle and high school students from Mason Crest Publishers in
cooperation with FPRI
http://www.masoncrest.com/
series_view.php?seriesID=77
---------------------------------------------------------- Copyright Foreign
Policy Research Institute (http://www.fpri.org/)
. You may forward this essay as you like provided that it is sent in its
entirety and attributed to FPRI. , provided that you send it in its
entirety.
The story of the Mossadegh revolution is greatly
over simplified, and underplays the popularity of the Shah and overstates
the popularity of Mossadegh. In those times the political class in Iran was
very small. The Tehran mob was for sale, and the same people who shouted
"Death to the Shah" could be hired by Dulles' agents for fifty cents a day
to parade in the market squares shouting Death to Mossadegh. While the CIA
was definitely involved in the restoration of the Shah, British Intelligence
had its own agenda which was more concerned with protection of purely
British interests. Britain at the time was readjusting its policy
commitments and had few resources available; recall that this was three
years before the British/Israeli invasion of Egypt and the Hungarian
uprising with its brutal suppression by the Soviet Union.
Stalin died in March of 1953. There was continued
fear that the Russians would go to the Rhine or further. This was the height
of the Cold War, and Stalin had not forgotten that his forces were withdrawn
from Iran by Truman's threat of nuclear war. The armistice that ended
the Korean War was signed in July 1953. All of this is relevant to the
history of those times.
Moreover, this elementary history to a very complex
story omits nearly entirely the Shah's White Revolution that attempted to
create a middle class; his efforts to liberate women; the open hostility of
the American liberal establishment as for instance the interview by Barbara
Walters of the Empress at a time when the Shah was being denounced by the
mullahs for allowing women to enter the university, but Walters was
castigating the Empress for not doing more for the liberation of women.
It is a very complex story, and one from which I
concluded well before Carter allowed the Shah to be overthrown that the best
US strategy would be to seek energy independence through development of
domestic nuclear power and other domestic resources.
SEE ALSO THE
CORRECTION posted in tomorrow's mail.
=============
"If you kill your son or daughter, you've done your
job and can stay."
http://www.latimes.com/news/
nationworld/world/la-fg-india-honor26
-2009sep26,0,665935,full.story
- Roland Dobbins
===========
HIH Ertuğrul Osman Efendi Hazretleri, RIP.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/24/nyregion/24osman.html>
Roland Dobbins
The last link. Fascinating.
=================
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